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EDITORIAL
The appellate division of the supreme 
court of the state of New York on June 
13, 1930, handed down its decision in the 
case of Ultramares Corporation, appellant, against the partners 
of Touche, Niven & Co., respondents. The consequences of 
this case will be far-reaching and it is gratifying to know that 
the decision has been appealed to the court of appeals of the 
state of New York. It is of the utmost importance that a 
case of this sort should reach the highest court to which it can be 
brought, so that the decision which shall ultimately appear will 
be valuable as a precedent for future judgment and a basis of 
future procedure. The doctrines enunciated by three judges of 
the appellate division, if carried into effect, would have a vital 
bearing upon the practice of every profession. The judges who 
rendered this majority decision are John V. McAvoy, Victor J. 
Dowling and James O’Malley. The dissenting opinion by Judges 
Edward R. Finch and Francis Martin was presented at the same 
time. Judge McAvoy, who rendered the decision for the 
majority, said:
“The defendants, public accountants, have been held liable to 
the plaintiff, to whom they owed no contractual duty through 
any contract of employment which the plaintiff entrusted to 
them. Whether a duty arises here, in the absence of direct con­
tractual relation, out of the situation shown by the evidence, is 
the problem for solution.
“The general principle involved, and upon which plaintiff 
relies for imposition of liability, is that if one undertakes to dis­
charge any duty by which the conduct of others may be governed, 
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thus led to action in the faith that such duty will be properly 
performed shall not suffer loss through improper performance of 
the duty or neglect in its execution. Thus, we have the buyers of 
merchandise given recovery against public weighers who were 
to make return of the weight and to furnish buyers with a copy. 
The public weighers certified the weight and the buyers paid the 
sellers on that basis. Discovery that the weight had been in­
correctly certified as a result of defendant’s negligence was found 
to give the plaintiffs the right to the resulting damage.
“It was decided there that the use of the certificates was not 
an indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers; 
that it was a consequence ‘which, to the weighers’ knowledge, 
was the end and aim of the transaction.’ The sellers ordered, 
but the buyers were to use the certificates. Public weighers hold 
themselves out to the public as ‘ skilled and careful in their calling.’ 
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 238.)
“The duty was held not to be bound in terms of contract, 
nor of privity; although arising from contract, its origin is not ex­
clusive from that realm. If the contract and the relation are 
found, the duty follows by rule of law. Diligence—it was 
pointed out—was owing not only to the person who ordered the 
employment, but also to those who relied thereon.
“Plaintiff here is in the business of factoring. The defendants 
were engaged by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to audit its books and ac­
counts and certify a balance-sheet as of the end of the year 1923. 
They prepared a balance-sheet and attached it to a certificate 
signed by them, which they dated February 26, 1924. This 
balance-sheet stated that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., had a net worth 
amounting to $1,070,715.26, when the fact (as thereafter found) 
was that at the very time of this certification the firm was in­
solvent, with impairment of thousands of dollars in its assets and 
credit and much enhancement of its reported liabilities.
“The finding of the jury would justify a conclusion that de­
fendants were guilty of a gross degree of negligence in their audit, 
and it is even urged that the evidence also warranted the finding 
that the balance-sheet was made up in fraud of the rights and 
obligations which accountants, engaged in public calling, would 
owe to those to whom they had reason to believe such balance- 
sheets would be exhibited for purposes of obtaining loans, ex­
tending credit or to induce the sale of merchandise.
“The evidence showed that these accountants knew for four 
years that their client (Fred Stern & Co., Inc.) was a borrower from 
banks in large sums; that these banks required certified balance- 
sheets as a basis for making loans; and that Fred Stern & Co., Inc., 
would require these certified balance-sheets for continuing existing 
loans and securing new loans. So that this might be done, some 
thirty-two original counterparts of the certified balance-sheet 
were requested by the client, Fred Stern & Co., Inc., and fur­
nished by the accountants (defendants).
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“The jury’s verdict thus imports that defendants knew that 
the certified balance-sheets would be used by Fred Stern & Co., 
Inc., for the purpose of procuring loans, and that the very 
purpose of employment in the transaction between Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and Touche, Niven & Co., the accountants, was to 
allow Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to bring it about through these 
balance-sheets. This results: that loans on the faith thereof 
would be made by persons who would be governed by its declara­
tions. Financial statements in the course of trade have come to 
be used customarily for the purpose of securing credit, and ac­
countants indicate in their public advertisements that makers 
of loans should require the safeguard of an independent audit pre­
pared by public accountants, so a corelative obligation is placed 
upon them. It is their duty—if they do not wish their audit to 
be so used—to qualify the statement of their balance-sheet and 
the certificate which accompanies it in such a way as to prevent 
its use. One cannot issue an unqualified statement which will 
be so used, and then disclaim responsibility for his work.
“Banks and merchants, to the knowledge of these defendants, 
require certified balance-sheets from independent accountants, 
and upon these audits they make their loans. Thus, the duty 
arises to these banks and merchants of an exercise of reasonable 
care in the making and uttering of certified balance-sheets.
“The facts here are brought within the rule in the case of 
International Products Co. v. Erie Railroad Co. (244 N. Y. 331) 
that ‘there must be knowledge, or its equivalent, that the in­
formation is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is 
given intends to rely and act upon it; that if false or erroneous he 
will, because of it, be injured in person or property. . . . The 
relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, 
must be such that in morals and good conscience the one has the 
right to rely upon the other for information, and the other giving 
the information owes a duty to give it with care.’
“The certificate which these accountants attached to the 
balance-sheet reads:
“‘Touche, Niven & Co., 
‘ Public Accountants, 
‘Eighty Maiden Lane, 
‘New York.
‘February 26, 1924.
‘ Certificate of Auditors.
‘ We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ended 
December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance-sheet is in 
accordance therewith and with the information and explanations given us. 
We further certify that, subject to provisions for federal taxes on income, the 
said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the financial 
condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.
‘Touche, Niven & Co.,
‘ Public Accountants.’
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“From this certificate and the findings made by the jury which 
are entitled to be held conclusive in behalf of the plaintiff there is 
established: that the defendants knew that the result of the audit 
would be used by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to represent its financial 
condition to persons from whom Fred Stern & Co., Inc., might 
seek to borrow money, and that the balance-sheet would be 
relied upon by such persons as indicating the true financial con­
dition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.; that defendants, in exercising 
their public calling as auditors, did not exercise that care and skill 
required of them, but acted in a negligent and careless manner, as 
a consequence of which the balance-sheet made by them was in­
correct, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
loss sustained by plaintiff, i. e., that there was a causal relation 
between the neglect and the loss sustained which could reasonably 
have been anticipated, and that the presentation of the balance- 
sheets, as certified by defendants, was the inducing cause for 
making these loans to Fred Stern & Co., Inc., which plaintiff 
made, and that the loss was not caused by reason of any change 
in the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., from the time 
of the presentation of the audit to the plaintiff, or because of any 
reliance of plaintiff on other intervening causes; and that plain­
tiff’s conduct was free from contributory negligence; and we there­
fore conclude that a liability was properly found, arising out of a 
duty owed by the defendants to plaintiff not to misrepresent, 
wilfully or negligently, the financial condition of Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., and that the judgment for the plaintiff was correct 
and should not have been set aside.
“That the particular person who was to be influenced by 
defendants’ act was unknown to the defendants is not material 
to a right to recovery, for it is not ‘ necessary that there should be 
an intent to defraud any particular person.’ In this case there 
was no mere casual representation made as a matter of courtesy; 
there was a certificate intended to sway conduct. There was 
‘the careless performance of a service which found in the words 
of a certificate its culmination and its summary.’ Here is an act 
performed carelessly, intended to influence the actions of third 
parties, and one that reasonably might be expected, when care­
lessly performed, to cause substantial loss.
“A duty exists towards those whom the accountants know 
will act on the faith of their certificates. The loss occurring 
here was the very result which reasonably was to be anticipated 
if the balance-sheet was carelessly prepared.
“While negligence was established and was the proximate 
cause of the loss, and, as we have seen, the duty arose out of this 
situation which, while not contractual, was, nevertheless, a 
ground of liability, yet we do not think that there was sufficient 
proof upon which to found a liability in fraud. We think that 
there was no error, at the close of the entire case, in the court’s 
decision to dismiss the second cause of action based upon that 
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ground. Misjudgment, however gross, or want of caution, 
however marked, is not fraud. The mere breach of duty or the 
omission to use due care is not fraud. Intentional fraud, as 
distinguished from a mere breach of duty or the omission to use 
due care, is an essential factor in an action for deceit. (Kountze 
v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124.)
“We think that there was a proper conclusion with respect 
to damages. The amount of cash loans made to Fred Stern & 
Co., Inc., with interest thereon, credited with all monies repaid 
or collected by plaintiff, whether through voluntary action or 
suit, without deduction of costs of collection, was the approximate 
damage, and while other proof of damage was excluded by the 
trial court, no appeal has been taken by plaintiff which raises a 
construction of that rule.
“The judgment and order appealed from should therefore be 
modified by reversing so much thereof as sets aside the verdict and 
dismisses the amended complaint as to the first cause of action, 
and by directing that the verdict be reinstated and judgment 
entered thereon with costs to the plaintiff, and as so modified 
affirmed without costs.”
The dissenting opinion reads as follows;
“Assuming that the defendants may be 
held liable for the negligence of their 
employees where they undertake a duty to a definite plaintiff 
(Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236), or to a definite class (Doyle 
v. Chatham & Phoenix National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369), yet, for 
the following reasons, the defendants are not liable to this plain­
tiff: first, because they undertook to make only a ‘balance- 
sheet audit’ at the request of their client; second, because in 
their certificate the defendants purported only to furnish their 
opinion based upon an examination in connection with ‘the in­
formation and explanations given us.’ But even more important, 
the defendants furnished such a report and certificate without 
reference to any particular person or class of persons.
“The plaintiff seeks to liken the facts in the case at bar to a case 
where the defendants were to make an audit which to their knowl­
edge was for a definite plaintiff, to induce such plaintiff to make 
loans thereon. (Glanzer v. Shepard, supra.) This record does 
not sustain such a contention. The courts have not gone to the 
length of holding that defendants in a case like the case at bar 
can be held liable in negligence to the whole world, or, as has 
been aptly said, liable for ‘negligence in the air.’
“ In other words, not only the purpose for which the statement 
is to be used, but the person or class of persons who is to rely 
thereon, must be definite to the knowledge of the defendants. 
The plaintiff relies upon the stipulation in the record that the 
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financial statements to banks or to creditors or to stockholders 
or to purchasers or sellers.’ In accordance with the authorities, 
this general knowledge is not sufficient.
“As Judge Andrews said in International Products Co. v. Erie 
R. R. Co. (244 N. Y. 231), speaking of the information given,
“‘that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon 
it; that if false or erroneous he will because of it be injured 
in person or property.’
In Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpora­
tion (245 N. Y. 377), Judge Pound writes:
“‘It (the defendant) did not deal with appellant, had no 
relations with it and was under no duty of care to it.’ (See 
also Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195.)
“The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, cer­
tifies for his client and not for all the world. If the client makes 
it clear to such a man that the statement is to be used in a particu­
lar transaction in which a third party is involved, such circum­
stances should create a duty from the professional man to such 
third party. If the accountant is to be held to an unlimited 
liability to all persons who may act on the faith of the certificate, 
the accountant would be obliged to protect himself by a verifica­
tion so rigid that its cost might well be prohibitive and a limited 
but useful field of service thus closed to him. The smallness of 
the compensation paid to the defendants for the services requested 
is in striking contrast to the enormity of the liability now sought 
to be imposed upon them. If in the case at bar the plaintiff had 
inquired of the accountants whether they might rely upon the 
certificate in making a loan, then the accountants would have 
had the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk, and 
determine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the 
account should be before assuming the responsibility of making 
the certificate run to the plaintiff.
“It also appears in the case at bar that the loss of the plaintiff 
resulted because of its own contributory negligence in failing 
to check the collateral. (Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55; 
aff’d 242 N. Y. 569.)
“In so far as the claim of actual fraud is concerned, there is 
no proof in this record sufficient to support such a finding by a 
jury. The court, therefore, properly dismissed this cause of 
action. (Civil practice act. section 457-a.) This is so, even 
assuming that personal connivance and fraud on the part of the 
employees of defendants could be held within the scope of the 
authority given to these employees by the defendants, which at 
least is doubtful. (Henry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; Credit Alliance 
Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N. Y. 216; Martin v. Gotham 
Nat'l. Bank, 248 N. Y. 313.)
“It follows that the judgment and order should be affirmed.”
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All Professions are 
Vitally Concerned
We print the two opinions in full be­
cause of the tremendous effect which 
either will have upon the future of all
professional work. If the majority opinion is allowed to stand it 
is impossible to foresee its full consequence, but this much seems 
certain, that a professional man, be he lawyer, physician, ac­
countant, architect, engineer or any other, will hesitate to express 
any opinion whatsoever in a positive way lest some third, fourth 
or one-hundredth person, not specifically contemplated at the 
time of the rendering of the opinion, may suffer or believe that he 
has suffered unduly and therefore demand from the professional 
man a “full, sufficient and perfect” satisfaction. An illustration 
of the way in which the dictum of the majority of the appellate 
division, if applied, as it would necessarily be applied, in all pro­
fessions if it were applied in one, can be found in a hypothetical
case. Let us suppose that a lawyer is called in to express an opin­
ion as to the effect of certain obligations assumed in a contract 
between two stock-ownership corporations. The client of the 
lawyer is one of these corporations. The lawyer, after reviewing 
the contract in its express terms, believes that it is sufficiently 
binding to protect the interests which his client desires to protect. 
For the sake of argument let us admit that the lawyer in making 
this review has overlooked some weakness which might have been 
discovered if he had had reason to suspect fraudulent intent on the 
part of the other corporation and let us suppose that the courts 
would consider this negligence. Subsequently, the weakness in the 
contract appears and the client corporation suffers the loss of 
substantial business and may ultimately find its way into bank­
ruptcy because of the operations of a contract not sufficiently 
protective. Is it to be supposed that a bank which has lent 
money to the client corporation can demand and recover from 
the lawyer whose advice was erroneous the full extent of its 
financial loss? Of course every lawyer knows that such a 
doctrine does not prevail. Or suppose that a physician is called in 
to diagnose a case and he dismisses it, without sufficient investi­
gation, as simply a case of chicken pox. In the course of a few 
days it develops that the disease is small pox and the house in 
which it occurs is quarantined and becomes in the public estima­
tion a pest house. There is an important property damage which 
might have been avoided if the disease had been originally properly 
diagnosed and the patient removed before publicity attended the 
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matter. If the doctrine of the majority opinion of the appellate 
division were to prevail the owner of the house could recover from 
the physician who rendered the opinion satisfaction for the finan­
cial loss attendant upon the occurrence of the disease.
We are not at the present time directly 
concerned with the question of negli­
gence which is raised in the case. It is 
gratifying to see that the decisions in every court brush aside all 
question of fraud. The worst that is admitted in any decision is 
negligence, and this the defendant denies. For the purpose of 
procuring the most far-reaching opinion of the courts it might 
perhaps be as well if the question of negligence were involved, 
because in time to come it is inevitable that there will be cases 
involving even gross negligence wherein the courts will be called 
upon to adjudicate points of financial responsibility. Where 
there is no negligence it does not seem to us conceivable that any 
court of competent jurisdiction would for a moment hold an 
accountant responsible for a failure to discover something which 
he could not reasonably be expected to discover. There is legal 
precedent for such an assertion. Where, however, there is accusa­
tion of negligence, whether well-founded or not, it is still doubtful 
whether a professional man is responsibile for the effects of his 
advice, but we must all admit that it is the duty of the courts to 
determine the extent of that financial responsibility if such re­
sponsibility there be. The moral responsibility is one which will 
probably not be called in question. It is the duty of every pro­
fessional man, as we are firmly convinced the defendants in the 
present suit did not fail to recognize, that fair, impartial and 
frank expression of the truth must be made.
The brief which was filed on behalf of 
the American Institute of Accountants, 
as amicus curiæ, was prepared by
Messrs. Covington, Burling and Rublee, counsel of the American 
Institute of Accountants, and presented by Messrs. Coudert 
Brothers, of the New York bar. This brief agrees to a great 
extent with the opinion rendered by the minority of the appellate 
division. It concerns itself solely with the question as to 
whether there was or was not any privity of interest between 
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Fred Stern & Co., Inc. We are inclined to think that an 
equally important question in the case is the whole matter of 
professional liability even where negligence is said to exist 
or even where it is found to exist. It is all very well to say that 
a man should not render an opinion which he is not prepared to 
support to the extent of his financial responsibility, but if this 
were carried to its logical conclusion it would become necessary 
for every professional man to divest himself of all financial re­
sponsibility, because, however careful he might be he could be 
found, by some court, negligent in the performance of his duty 
and thereby financially liable. The brief presented on behalf of 
the American Institute of Accountants was an able exposition of 
the case which seems to us to deal comprehensively with the 
points raised in the majority opinion of the court and to dispose of 
them completely. The following extracts from the brief are of 
special application:
Statement
"This brief is directed solely to the question of whether there 
was any privity between the plaintiff and defendants, whereby it 
could have been held that the defendants had been guilty of a 
breach of duty to the plaintiff.
"Accountants are engaged by a corporation to examine its 
accounts and prepare a balance-sheet. The accountants do so, 
and give their certificate attesting to the examination and certify­
ing that the balance-sheet ‘is in accordance therewith and with 
the information and explanations given us,’ and that it presents 
in the accountants’ opinion a true and correct view of the cor­
poration’s financial condition. The accountants are not informed 
that the balance-sheet and certificate are to be presented to the 
plaintiff or that they are to be used for any particular purpose, 
but the accountants know generally that the report will be used 
as a financial statement to banks or to creditors or to stockholders 
or to purchasers or sellers. The plaintiff advances money to the 
corporation relying upon the correctness of the balance-sheet and 
Certificate of the defendants. The corporation is adjudged a 
bankrupt, and some of the moneys advanced are not repaid to the 
plaintiff. If the balance-sheet was incorrect and if the account­
ant was negligent in preparing it, can such a plaintiff recover his 
losses from the accountant?
"The American Institute of Accountants, which contains within 
its membership persons in all parts of the United States who are 
engaged in the practice of accountancy, is interested in this 
question. It submits this brief as amicus curia, in support of the 
decision of the court below, where it was held that there existed 
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no privity between the lender and the accountants whereby the 
lender could complain of the breach of any legal duty.
“This brief does not deal with the question of whether or not in 
fact there was negligence by the accountants; whether such 
negligence if it existed was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
loss; the possible effect of intervening fraudulent acts of Stern, 
or the effect of contributory negligence by the plaintiff.
“POINT I
“The accountant should not be liable to one who is un­
known TO HIM.
“The professional man who certifies to the correctness of a 
statement, be he lawyer, abstractor, surveyor, weigher, tester, or 
accountant, does so for his client or employer, not for all the world. 
If the client or employer makes it clear to the professional man 
that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction in 
which a third party is involved, the circumstances may create a 
duty from the professional man to such a third party. But it is 
difficult to imagine any circumstances which would place upon 
the professional man who furnishes a certificate a duty to all 
persons into whose hands the certificate may find its way.
“Such a theory would in effect make the certificate a quasi 
negotiable instrument passing from hand to hand and entitling 
the bearer to damages against the professional man.
‘‘ If such a rule should be adopted it would be impossible for the 
professional man to determine what his fee should be for making 
the certificate, since he would have no means of determining the 
possible extent of his responsibility.
“An accountant must always determine how thorough his 
verification of accounts is to be. There is always an element of 
discretion in his work. If his certificate is merely for the security 
of the person who employs him, the accountant may be justified in 
accepting information from such person which he should not pass 
without further verification if he is informed that a third party is to 
act on the certificate. There is always a point at which the degree 
of verification should stop in order to prevent the cost of an audit 
from being out of all proportion to reason, and this point is to be 
determined in each case largely by the relationship between the 
accountant and his client and the definite use to which the ac­
countant knows the certificate is to be put. If the accountant 
were to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons who may 
act on the faith of the certificate, the accountant would be put 
under an enormous responsibility and would be obliged to protect 
himself by a verification so rigid that its cost would usually be 
prohibitive.
“Counsel for the appellant argue that the accountants in the 
case at bar might by appropriate language have limited their 
obligation to their employer, and not having done so their obliga­
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tion became unlimited (appellant’s brief, page 68). Such an 
argument leads nowhere, for the converse is just as logical and is 
more in accordance with sound business practices. If the plain­
tiff in the case at bar had wished to rely upon the accountants’ 
certificate as a basis for making the loan, the plaintiff could readily 
have demanded from the borrower a certificate running to the plaintiff. 
The certificate the defendants had given their client stated that 
the balance-sheet was in part in accordance with ‘ the information 
and explanations given us.’ Had the plaintiff asked that the cer­
tificate run to its benefit it is reasonable to believe that the plain­
tiff would have been informed what the ‘ information ’ and ‘ expla­
nations’ were, or that the accountants would have stated how 
thorough their verification of accounts had been and whether 
they thought the verification sufficient for plaintiff’s purposes. If 
such a certificate had been obtained a basis would have been 
established for claiming that the accountants owed a duty to the 
plaintiff, and the accountants, learning the definite purpose for 
which the certificate was required could have gauged their re­
sponsibility and risk and could intelligently have determined how 
thorough their verification of accounts should have been before 
making a certificate to the plaintiff.
“We shall endeavor to show in the following pages of this brief 
that the decision of the court below is consistent with the decisions 
in this state and with the law generally on the subject, and that 
liability for negligence by a professional man in preparing a 
certificate is not extended to persons who were unknown to him.
“POINT II
“The New York decisions relied on by appellant can 
READILY BE DISTINGUISHED.
“In their brief (p. 79) under the heading ‘The Law’ counsel 
for the appellant say:
“‘The leading cases in this state are Glanzer v. Shepard, 
233 N. Y. 236, and International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. 
Co., 244 N.Y. 331.’
“In Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, Bech Van Siclen & 
Company had sold to the plaintiff 905 bags of beans, to be paid 
for in accordance with weight sheets certified by public weighers. 
The seller requested the defendants, who were public weighers, 
to make a return of the weight and to furnish the buyers with 
a copy. The return of the weighers recited that it had been 
made by order of Bech Van Siclen & Company ‘for G. Bros.’ 
(the plaintiffs). The weighers sent one copy to the seller (the 
plaintiffs). The court said,
‘ “The plaintiffs’ use of the certificates was not an indirect 
or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers. It 
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was a consequence which to the weighers’ knowledge, was 
the end and aim of the transaction. * * * They sent a copy to 
the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action. ’
“In International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co., 244 N. Y. 331, 
the plaintiff, an importer, was expecting a consignment of goods 
by steamer. It arranged with defendant, a common carrier, to 
receive them on its lighters, transfer them to its warehouse docks 
and then ship them upon order. After the steamer arrived the 
plaintiff inquired of the defendant where the goods were to be 
stored and stated to the defendant that it desired this information 
for the purpose of obtaining insurance. The defendant, taking 
time to obtain the required information, replied that they were 
docked at dock F, Weehawken. The plaintiff obtained its 
insurance, passing on to the insurer the information given to it by 
the defendant. As a matter of fact the goods had not been 
received by defendant, when it gave plaintiff the information, 
and when they were subsequently received one-half of them were 
stored at dock D, which dock with the goods thereon was sub­
sequently destroyed by fire. Plaintiff could not recover its insur­
ance because of the misdescription and sued defendant for its 
negligent statement.
“These cases can readily be distinguished from the case at bar. 
In each of them the defendant dealt directly with the plaintiff, 
and had actual and exact knowledge of the purpose for which the 
information was to be given the plaintiff. In the case at bar the 
defendants did not deal with the plaintiff, had no knowledge that 
the certificate was obtained for the purpose of obtaining a loan 
from the plaintiff, and in fact had no knowledge of the plaintiff in 
the transaction.
“POINT III
“Savings bank v. ward, 100 u. s. 195, completely sustains 
THE DISTINCTION MADE BY THE COURT BELOW.
“Counsel for the appellant contend that the fact that it was 
stipulated
“‘that they (defendants) knew generally that these reports 
would be used as financial statements to banks or to creditors 
or to stockholders or to purchasers or sellers ’ (fol. 581),
was sufficient to make the respondents liable to any person who 
might lend money on the strength of the report, and, at page 93 
of their brief, the appellant’s counsel say:
“‘We are confident that no authority will be cited by de­
fendants which supports the claim that they are without any 
duty toward those who they know will act upon the faith of 
their certificates, or that distinguishes between cases where 
the defendants have knowledge that an individual plaintiff 
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will act or that some member of a class, of which the plaintiff 
is one, will act upon their certificate.’
“In making this broad statement counsel overlook the decision 
of the supreme court of the United States in Savings Bank v. 
Ward, 100 U. S. 195, a case which is of particular interest in that 
it was cited and quoted with approval, or at least with acquies­
cence, in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, upon which appellant 
relies.
“In that case the defendant, an attorney, was employed by 
Chapman to examine Chapman’s title to certain real estate. In 
pursuance of such employment the defendant gave Chapman, 
who paid him therefor, a certificate of title wherein the defendant 
certified that Chapman had good title to the real estate and that 
it was unencumbered. With the aid of this certificate Chapman 
obtained a loan from the plaintiff bank upon the security of the 
property named in the certificate. The defendant attorney was 
negligent in that he had overlooked a deed executed by Chapman 
and recorded shortly prior to the date of his certificate, by which 
deed Chapman had conveyed the property covered by the certifi­
cate to a third party so that Chapman had no title. The plain­
tiff’s security therefore was of no value, and the plaintiff claimed 
damages as a result of the negligence of the defendant. Suit was 
thus brought by the plaintiff bank against the defendant attorney. 
The action was dismissed, the court saying, at page 205:
“ ‘. . . the difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs is that they 
never employed the defendant to search the records, examine the 
title, or make the report, and it clearly appears that he never 
performed any such service at their request or in their behalf, 
and that they never paid him any thing for the service he did 
perform in respect to that transaction; nor is there any evidence 
tending to show any privity of contract between them and the 
defendant, within the meaning of the law as expounded by the 
decisions of the court.'
“The especial significance of this decision, in view of the state­
ment of appellant’s counsel, lies in the fact that there, as is con­
tended in the case at bar, the defendant had every reason to be­
lieve that the certificate would be used as the basis of a loan. 
Thus the evidence for the defendant showed
“' that the said Chapman did not communicate to the defendant 
for what purpose he wanted the certificate; but that, unless a 
contrary opinion were expressed, he, defendant, would have 
supposed from the usual course of business, knowing Chapman 
to be the owner of the property about to be examined, that the 
certificate was obtained for the use of a prospective lender or 
purchaser. ’ (See page 8 of the record in that case which is 
found in volume 7 of the transcript of records of the supreme 
court for the October term, 1879, at page 5123.)
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‘ ‘ The plaintiff’s first prayer for instructions was:
“'If the jury shall find from the evidence that the de­
fendant held himself out to the public as a person skilled in the 
examination of titles to real estate in the District of Columbia 
and that he was employed as such skilled examiner of titles 
aforesaid by Leonard S. Chapman to examine the titles to the 
property in question, that as a result of said examination 
the defendant gave to the said Chapman who paid him 
therefor the two certificates in evidence, the defendant know­
ing that he thereby enabled the said Chapman to get credit from 
the public as the owner of the property so certified by the de­
fendant to be the unencumbered property of the said Chapman; 
and if the jury shall further find that the plaintiff gave credit 
to the said Chapman upon the faith of the said certificate; 
then the jury are instructed as a matter of law that these 
facts confer upon the plaintiff a legal right to maintain his 
action although no contract relations existed between him 
and the defendant.’
This prayer was denied, and the plaintiff excepted. See page 8 
of the record referred to.
“It is noteworthy that this case was not allowed to go to the 
jury. The record shows that a verdict was directed for the 
defendant. And it was this directed verdict that was affirmed by 
the supreme court.
“It is not necessary to go to the record, however, to ascertain 
that the supreme court passed on the question of whether liability 
was established by the general understanding of the attorney that 
the certificate would be used as the basis of a loan. In the dis­
senting opinion occurs the direct statement:
“ ‘ Ward was employed by Chapman to examine and certify 
to the title to a certain lot in Washington. The circumstances 
were such as ought to have satisfied him that his certificate was 
to be used by Chapman in some transaction with another person 
as evidence of the facts certified to. ’
“But, as has been stated, the majority of the United States 
supreme court held that this was not sufficient to establish liability 
for negligence to persons who might rely on the certificate as 
evidence of such facts, since the defendant ‘ never performed any 
such service at their request and in their behalf,’ and since there 
was 'no evidence tending to show any privity of contract between 
them and the defendant.’
“This decision is also interesting in that it distinguished the 
cases of poisoning, etc., where, the act of negligence being im­
minently dangerous to the lives of others, the wrong-doer is liable 
to the injured party, whether there is any contract relationship 




“Many decisions involving accountants, abstractors, 
TESTERS, INSPECTORS AND ARCHITECTS SUSTAIN THE PROPOSITION 
THAT AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A CERTIFICATE CAN ONLY BE 
MAINTAINED WHERE THERE IS PRIVITY.
“In Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, public accountants were 
employed by a corporation to audit its books. The plaintiff 
Landell bought eleven shares of stock in the corporation on the 
strength of the report prepared by the accountants as to assets 
and liabilities of the corporation. The report of the accountants 
had been shown to the plaintiff by one who suggested that the 
plaintiff buy the stock. The report was alleged to be untrue and 
the plaintiff, having relied on the report, claimed damages. For 
the purposes of the decision the allegations of the complaint were 
taken as true. The court held that there was no duty owed to the 
plaintiff and therefore there was no liability.
“ In Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun. 131, one O’Donnell, by his agent 
Winslow, applied to the plaintiff for a loan to be secured by a 
mortgage on certain property which O’Donnell claimed to own. 
The plaintiff told the agent to procure a proper search from the 
county clerk’s office and if the property was clear the loan would 
be made. The search was made by defendant, who was paid for 
his services by O’Donnell. The defendant did not know for what 
purpose the abstract was obtained. The abstract showed the 
title to be good, and a loan was made to O’Donnell by plaintiff 
on the faith of the abstract. At the time of making the search 
and lending the money there was on record a deed from O’Don­
nell, conveying the land to a third party, which deed was not 
mentioned in the search. Because of this deed plaintiff was 
unable to collect his money on the mortgage, and O’Donnell was 
insolvent. It was held that as the defendant had no knowledge 
that the abstract was obtained for the purpose of getting a loan 
the defendant was not liable.
“In Glawatz v. Peoples Guaranty Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465, 
defendant prepared and furnished to one Peacock upon his re­
quest an abstract of title to certain premises owned by Peacock. 
The certificate ran to Peacock, his heirs, devisees and grantees, 
and to Eastern Building and Loan Association, mortgagee. The 
abstract contained a statement to the effect that a certain mort­
gage on the premises was for $3,000. In fact this mortgage was 
for $3,200. Subsequently Peacock conveyed to Bane, and Bane 
conveyed to the plaintiff, to whom the abstract was delivered. 
In completing her purchase, in consequence of the erroneous state­
ment referred to above, plaintiff paid $200 in excess of what she 
otherwise would have paid. The court held there was no duty 
owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, and refused to allow a 
recovery.
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“In Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, one Rhea applied to the 
defendants for an abstract of title to certain land owned by him, 
and defendants furnished him with such an abstract. On the 
faith of the abstract an investment company loaned Rhea $2,100, 
and took his notes secured by a trust of the land covered by the 
abstract. After the loan had been accepted by the investment 
company the defendants completed the abstract of title by noting 
the deed of trust made by Rhea to secure the notes. Through 
neglect of the defendants there was a mistake in the certificate. 
The plaintiff bought from the investment company the notes 
secured by the deed of trust but before buying them demanded a 
title abstract. The investment company exhibited to the plain­
tiff the abstract prepared by the defendant and on the faith of that 
the plaintiff bought the notes. The plaintiff, the purchaser of 
the notes, sued the abstractor but the court refused to allow 
recovery on the ground that there was no privity.
“In National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, the 
defendants held themselves out as expert inspectors and testers of 
construction and building materials. At the request of plaintiff’s 
vendor, they made for plaintiff’s vendor an inspection of re-laying 
rails and issued a certificate of inspection to plaintiff’s vendor. 
Plaintiff purchased the rails from the party to whom the certifi­
cate had been issued, and relied on the certificate. Defendants 
did not deliver a certificate to the plaintiff, nor were they advised 
that the plaintiff was going to rely on their inspection. The rails 
turned out to be of a poorer grade than the certificate stated and 
plaintiff sued the inspectors. It was held that there could be no 
recovery.
“In Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267, Livingston in­
spected some wheat for Empire Mills, and certified that he had 
inspected for account of the Empire Mills out of a certain grain 
elevator into a certain barge 20,000 bushels of number one, red 
winter wheat. He was employed by the Empire Mills and gave 
his certificate to them. They had sold the wheat to the plaintiff, 
and it was loaded in a barge to be shipped to the plaintiff. By 
the recognized custom of the trade, the certificate of inspection 
accompanied the draft sent the purchaser of the grain, who usually 
accepted and paid the draft without inspecting the grain. The 
plaintiff paid the draft which accompanied Livingston’s certificate 
on the faith of the certificate and without examining the wheat. 
The certificate was incorrect, and the plaintiff sued Livingston for 
negligence. The court held that no duty was owed by Livingston 
to the plaintiff and that therefore he was not liable.
“In Le Lievre v. Gould (1893) 1 Q. B. 491, an owner of land 
agreed to convey to a builder certain land for an annual rental of a 
fixed amount, the builder agreeing as a condition precedent to the 
conveyance to erect two dwellings thereon to the satisfaction of 
the owner or his architect. The owner employed defendant as 
his architect who agreed to give certificates from time to time as 
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to the progress of the work. The owner arranged to have a third 
person lend a specified amount to the builder to build the build­
ing, such loan to be secured by mortgage from the builder to the 
third person. The owner gave to the architect a schedule of ad­
vances to be made under the mortgage as the work progressed. 
Thereafter the mortgage was executed. The architect was 
negligent in giving incorrect certificates as to the progress of the 
work. The mortgagee who relied on them in making advances 
was damaged and entered suit against the architect. The suit 
was dismissed because there was no privity of contract between 
the architect and plaintiff and no duty owed by the architect to 
the plaintiff, Lord Ersher, M. R., saying:
“‘A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards 
the whole world if he owes no duty to them.’
“Other cases to the same effect are Thomas v. Guaranty Title & 
Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432; Equitable Building and Loan Associa­
tion v. Bank of Commerce and Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678; and 
Lockwood v. Title Insurance Co., 130 N. Y. S. 824.
“ Conclusion
“It is therefore respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
court below was correct and should be affirmed, on the ground that 
there was no such duty from the defendants to the plaintiff as 
would allow a recovery.
“Dated, May 12, 1930.
“Respectfully submitted,
“American Institute of Accountants 
“As Amicus Curice








“Union Trust Building, Washington, D. C., 
“Of Counsel.”
The Ultimate Effect of 
Decision if Sustained 
Inasmuch as the matter is now in a sense 
sub judice, awaiting a hearing and 
decision by the court of appeals, it
might be improper to analyze in detail the process of reasoning 
by which the majority members of the appellate division
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reached their decision. On the one point of financial responsi­
bility it may be proper to point out that the professional man 
who assumes a responsibility to all the world, as Judge Walsh in 
the lower court very appropriately described it, would have to 
charge fees for his services sufficient to cover any possible assess­
ment of damages, and, inasmuch as responsibility to all the world 
is a fairly comprehensive matter, it would seem that the fees 
charged in any case should be all the money in the world—which, 
of course is reductio ad absurdum. It is known that the Ameri­
can Institute of Accountants hopes to be permitted to appear as 
amicus curiae before the court of appeals in its effort to main­
tain its contention. Until that appeal shall have been heard we 
refrain from further comment.
Economics and 
Accountancy
In The Journal of Accountancy for 
June, 1930, appeared an editorial note 
advocating the introduction of political
economy as a subject in all accounting examinations for C. P. A. 
certification or for admission to the Institute. In the course of 
that editorial it was stated that Maryland was the only state 
which had an examination in political economy. This statement 
was incorrect. In at least two other states, Michigan and 
Wisconsin, there is examination in this subject. We extend 
thanks to correspondents who have brought this matter to 
attention and apologize for forgetfulness.
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